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I. INTRODUCTION'
Of all the recent legal literature examining the role of nations
and corporations in cyberspace, very little has been devoted to the
relationship between state-sponsored information operations-the roles
and uses of cyberspace in interstate conflict-and neutrality. Most of
the legal scholarship has been devoted to applying the laws of war to
cyberspace operations. Issues such as proportionality, lawful targeting,
and when an action constitutes a hostile act, appear to have taken
preeminence over other matters. This article departs from that construct
and addresses a related and equally important issue: the enforcement of
neutrality in cyberspace. The United States will not always be a party to
a conflict, and the executive branch's official stated policy may be to
adhere to a position of non-intervention or even strict neutrality.
Admittedly, unlike in mid-twentieth century conflicts, it has
become increasingly difficult for a state to regulate commerce,
particularly electronic commerce, because of the internationalization of
global business and the worldwide transit of electronic information
across cyberspace. At present, roughly eighty percent of the Internet
traffic traverses through the United States, chiefly through servers
owned by private enterprise.2 As a result, transactions which occur
between London and Tokyo will still likely travel through the United
States. Electronic information which flows through cyberspace is unlike
any other type of physical transaction. Physical mails and shipped
goods may leave London and reach Tokyo without ever traversing the
geographic territory of a third state. Even an undersea telephone wire
cable theoretically enables a predictable flow between two points,
without transiting a third state.
Historically, national governments tried to remain neutral in
third-party conflicts because conflict eroded commerce and the addition
of interested states into a conflict tended to lengthen wars, thereby
increasing the loss of lives. Neutrality, as discussed below, was
recognized as a set of behavioral norms that limited the damage of
warfare to warring states, notwithstanding commercial losses attendant
with warfare. The United States, since its existence, has both
recognized the importance of neutrality principles and demanded that
other states act similarly. But, while it is well-understood that the
behavioral requirements of neutral states are usually enforceable in the
1 This issue was first addressed by Colonel Steven Korns and (then) Major Joshua
Kastenberg in Georgia's Cyber Left Hook, PARAMETERS, 2008, at 60. The author thanks
Colonel Koms for his insight and assistance in developing the concepts of cyber
neutrality further. Sections of this law review article incorporate themes from the article
in Parameters. However, the intended audience here is practitioners of operations law.
2 See, e.g., GABRIEL WEIMANN, TERROR ON THE INTERNET: THE NEW ARENA, THE NEW
CHALLENGE 183-87 (2005).
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physical realm, the advent of cyberspace makes this more difficult,
particularly in the realm of information and electronic warfare.
The executive branch of the United States, with legislative
checks, is the arm of government charged with determining and
enforcing foreign policy. The executive branch may conclude that it is
not in the best interests of the nation to remain fully neutral. Certainly,
the enforcement of neutrality in cyberspace has not yet occurred, and
there appears to be no policy for enforcement. This article suggests a
rubric using existing laws for exerting executive authority.
Section I of this article discusses the emergence of conflict in
cyberspace. Importantly, this article does not address either criminal
enforcement or a state's duty in that realm but instead focuses on the
executive branch's authority to enforce neutrality in cyberspace.
Section II provides a basic rubric of neutrality rules as applied to
conflict in cyberspace. Section III analyzes the most recent cyber-
conflict, the Georgian-Russian War of 2008, and the potential
consequences the United States risked because it lacked a cyber neutral
position. Finally, the article concludes with an assessment of the need
for a greater exertion of authority from the executive branch to police
cyberspace. Importantly, this article does not advocate that the United
States must take a wholly neutral position in conflicts which do not
involve it. However, the executive branch should make clear that it has
the authority to enforce cyber neutrality when it is determined by that
branch to be necessary to national policy.
II. EMERGENCE OF CYBER WARFARE
Although the concept of cyber warfare is not new, since 2005
there has been an escalation of proxy conflict within cyberspace,
particularly in two notable instances. In 2007, the Estonian government
suffered cyber attacks on its infrastructure. The attack degraded
enough critical media and communications systems that it rendered the
government impotent to conduct its essential functions of monitoring
the country's economy and command and control over military forces.4
The Estonia "911" emergency equivalent was off-line for an extended
period. The natural inclination of several observers was to suspect the
Russian government of orchestrating the attack.5 No public evidence
3 Jeffrey T.G. Kelsey, Hacking into International Humanitarian Law: The Principles of
Distinction and Neutrality in the Age of Cyber Warfare, 106 ICH. L. REv 1427, 1428-
29 (2008) (citing Newly Nasty, ECONOMIST, May 26, 2007, at 63); Korns & Kastenberg,
supra note 1, at 63.
4 Kelsey, supra note 3, at 1429.
5 Korns & Kastenberg, supra note 1, at 65.
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has emerged to sustain this suspicion.6 In response to the attacks,
Estonia appealed to the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization for assistance.7
On July 19, 2008, an Internet cyber security firm reported on a
distributed denial of service (DDoS) cyber attack against the country of
Georgia.8 Three weeks later, on August 8, security experts observed a
second round of DDoS attacks against Georgia, this time more
substantial, with multiple command and control (C2) servers
concentrated against Georgian governmental and commercial websites.
Analysts noted that this second round of DDoS attacks appeared to
coincide with the movement of Russian troops into South Ossetia in
response to Georgian military operations a day earlier in this region. 9
By August 10, DDoS attacks rendered most Georgian governmental
websites inoperable.'
0
As a result of the DDoS attacks, the Georgian government
found itself cyber-locked, barely able to communicate on the Internet. "1
In response to the situation, the Georgian government took an
unorthodox step and sought "cyber refuge" in the United States.' 2
Without first seeking U.S. government approval, Georgia relocated its
6 Id.; see also, Scott Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber
Attacks in International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L., 192, 193 (2009).
7 Korns & Kastenberg, supra note 1, at 63; Shackelford, supra note 5.
8 Koms & Kastenberg, supra note 1, at 64-65; Steven Adair, The Website for the
President of Georgia Under Attack - Politically Motivated?, SHADOWSERVER
FOUNDATION, July 20, 2008, http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmwiki.php/Calendar/
20080720 (last visited Sept. 2, 2009). Shadowserver specifically reported:
For over 24 hours, the website of President Mikhail Saakashvili of
Georgia has been rendered unavailable due to a multi-pronged
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. The site began coming
under attack very early Saturday morning. Shadowserver has
observed at least one web-based command and control (C2) server
taking aim at the website hitting it with a variety of simultaneous
attacks. The C2 server has instructed its bots to attack the website
with TCP, ICMP, and HTTP floods ... the C2 server involved in
these attacks is on IP address 207.10.234.244, which is subsequently
located in the United States.
9 Adair, supra note 8; Korns & Kastenberg, supra note 1, at 65.
10 Steven Adair, Georgian Websites Under Attack - DDoS and Defacement,
SHADOWSERVER FOUNDATION, Aug. 11, 2008, http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/
pmwiki.php/Calendar/20080811 (last visited Sept. 2, 2009); Shaun Waterman, Georgia
Hackers Strike Apart From Russian Military, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2008,
http://www.washtimes.com/news/2008/aug/l 9/georgia-hackers-strike-apart-from-
russian-military (last visited Sept. 7, 2009); Karl Zimmerman, Webhosting Report,
Steadfast Networks, comment posted July 20, 2008, http://www.webhostingtalk.com/
showpost.php?p=5220780&postcount=41 (last visited Sept. 11, 2009).
11 Koms & Kastenberg, supra note 1, at 66.
12 Id.
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Presidential website to a U.S. web hosting company and moved its
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) press dispatches to Google's
Blogspot. 13 The MFA also mirrored its Internet services at a site in
Estonia and on the website of Poland's president, Lech Kaczynski.'14
Georgian-Russian hostilities in South Ossetia generated a
substantial amount of analysis and speculation regarding the underlying
cyber conflict. 15 Most of the focus has centered on who conducted the
cyber attacks, and why. However, the Georgian-Russian conflict
provides an opportunity to examine a more subtle, intriguing, and
perhaps overlooked aspect of cyber conflict-the concept of cyber
neutrality. The Georgian case raises two fundamental questions: can
the United States remain neutral (or cyber neutral) during a cyber
conflict, and how did the actions of the Georgian government and
private U.S. information technology (IT) companies impact U.S. status
as a cyber neutral?
The implications of these two questions should concern U.S.
policy makers and military strategists. Even if the United States is not a
belligerent in a cyber conflict, incursions on the U.S. Internet
infrastructure will likely occur. Private industry owns and operates the
Internet. The unregulated action of these third party actors during a
cyber conflict could unintentionally impact U.S. cyber neutrality. There
is little, if any, modern legal precedence which resolves this question.
Nonetheless, the fact that U.S. IT companies provided cyber assistance
to the Georgian government, without any apparent U.S. government
involvement, exemplifies a significant cyber policy issue. Although
nations still bear ultimate responsibility for the acts of their citizens or
surrogates, translating this protocol to fit the modern realities of cyber
conflict is a complex challenge. By relocating its cyber assets to the
13 Adair, supra note 10; see also MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF GEORGIA,
http://georgiamfa.blogspot.com (last visited Sept. 7, 2009); Noah Shachtman, Estonia,
Google Help "Cyberlocked" Georgia, WIRED: DANGER ROOM, Aug. 11, 2008,
http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/08/civilge-the-geo.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2009);
Peter Svensson, Georgian President's Web Site Moves to Atlanta, USATODAY.COM,
Aug. 11, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/products/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2009);
Tulip Systems Incorporated, http://www.tshost.com (last visited Sept. 11, 2009).
14 John Markoff, Georgia Takes a Beating in the Cyberwar With Russia, N.Y. TIMES:
BITS BLOG, Aug. 11, 2008, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/08/l1/georgia-takes-a-
beating-in-the-cyberwar-with-russia (last visited Sept. 7, 2009); see also Information
About The Latest Developments In Georgia, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
GEORGIA, http://www.president.pl/x.node?id=20043119 (accessed on the web site of the
President of Poland) (last visited Sept. 7, 2009); Shachtman, supra note 13.
15 Koms & Kastenberg, supra note 1, at 67-68; Markoff, supra note 13; see also Kim
Hart, Longtime Battle Lines Are Recast In Russia And Georgia's Cyberwar, WASH.
POST, Aug. 14, 2008, at D1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/08/13/AR2008081303623.html; Noah Shachtman, Georgia
Under Online Assault, WIRED: DANGER ROOM, Aug. 10, 2008,
http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/08/georgia-under-o.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2009).
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United States, Georgia's unconventional response to the July and
August 2008 DDoS attacks, supported by U.S. industry, adds a new
element of complication that strategists need to consider in planning for
future cyber operations.
This is not to argue that the United States failed to plan for the
eventuality of a cyber conflict, and it is important to note that defense
capabilities may be used to enforce cyber neutrality if the need to do so
arises. The Executive Branch of the U.S. Government has prepared for
the eventuality of a cyberwar. In 1997, President William J. "Bill"
Clinton established the President's Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection. The Commission predicted that by 2002, 19
million people would have the ability to launch cyber attacks. It also
noted that since little in the way of specialized equipment is needed to
conduct such attacks, governments could expect an exponential growth
in increasingly sophisticated malicious cyber activity. 16
On May 22, 1998, President Clinton issued Presidential
Decision Directive/NSC-63. 7 In it, the President noted, "The United
States possesses both the world's strongest military and its largest
national economy. Those two aspects of our power are mutually
reinforcing and dependent. They are also increasingly reliant upon
certain critical infrastructures and upon cyber-based information
systems."' 18  In 2002, President George W. Bush issued National
Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 16, which directed the
government to review offensive capabilities against enemy computer
networks.19  In 2004, President Bush issued NSPD-38, National
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.20  The two strategy documents are
related in the same manner in which offense and defense are related in a
military operational construct. Both documents are not releasable to the
general public due to classification considerations.
In 2008, President Bush promulgated NSPD 54/Homeland
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 23, Cyber Security and
Monitoring. While NSPD 54/HSPD 23 remains classified, its definition
of cyberspace is: "'Cyberspace' means the interdependent network of
information technology infrastructures, and includes the Internet,
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded
6 COMMISSION ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, WHITE PAPER, THE CLINTON
ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE POLICY: PRESIDENTIAL
DECISION DIRECTIVE 63 ( May 22, 1998), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/
7aper598.htm.
7 See generally Presidential Decision Directive NSC-63, Critical Infrastructure
Protection (May 22, 1998), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-63.htm.18 id
19 See Bradley Graham, Bush Orders Guidelines for Cyber Warfare, WASH. POST, Feb.
7, 2003, at Al.
20 National Security Presidential Directive 38, National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
(2004) (quotation is unclassified portion of a classified document).
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processors and controllers in critical industries.' Later, Deputy
Secretary of Defense Gordon England, issued a memorandum that
defined cyberspace as "a global domain within the information
environment consisting of the interdependent network of information
technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and
controllers. 22
Presently there are two proposed bills pending in the United
States Senate that will enable the executive branch to exert greater
control over cyberspace during emergencies. Senator Jay Rockefeller
(D - West Virginia) introduced Senate Bill 773 titled the Cybersecurity
Act of 2009.23 Section 18 of the proposed act enables the President to
declare an emergency and order the limitation or shutdown of a Federal
Government or United States critical information infrastructure system
or network.24 While the pending bill is designed to place the Director of
National Intelligence and the Secretary of Commerce as the primary
agencies for ensuring cyber-security, the Department of Defense will
have an advisory role.25  Senator Thomas Carper (D - Delaware)
introduced the second bill, the United States Information and
Communications Enhancement Act of 2009. 26 This bill would establish
a National Office for Cyberspace in the White House, charged with
overseeing the execution of cybersecurity policies and procedures in the
federal government.2 7 Neither act expressly touches on the subject of
cyber neutrality, but both would give to the executive branch a leverage
of control over the internet to enforce neutrality during national
emergencies.
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has prepared for the
eventuality of cyber operations in a wartime context as evidenced in
directives, instructions, and doctrine. The Joint Functional Component
Command for Network Warfare is the sole agency for network attack.
However, with the pending creation of the sub-unified command, the
authority to conduct network warfare will fall to the commander of the
21 National Security Presidential Directive 38/ Homeland Security Presidential Directive
23, Security and Monitoring (2008) (quotation is unclassified portion of a classified
document).
22 Both definitions are contained in the Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of
Defense Memo to the Military Departments et al., subject: "The Definition of
Cyberspace" (12 May 2008), and its accompanying staff papers (on file with author).
23 S. 773, 111 th Cong. (2009); see also R. Michael Senkowski & Mimi W. Dawson,
Cybersecurity: A Briefing -Part II, METRO. CORP. CouNs., Aug. 2009, at 34.
24 773, 111 th Cong. (2009), § 18.25 Id. § 3.
26 S. 921, 111 th Cong. (2009).
27Id. § 3552.
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new command. This command is slated to be fully operational in
October 2009. 28
DOD Directive (DODD) 0-3600.3, Technical Assurance
Standard for Computer Network Attack (CNA) Capabilities, was
promulgated on May 13, 2005. This directive is classified "Top Secret,"
except for the name. Presumably, it contains, as the name implies,
capabilities requirements for conducting CNA. Because CNA is defined
as "[o]perations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information
resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and
networks themselves," in DODD 3600.01, Information Operations,
dated August 14, 2006, it can also be assumed that the classified
document approaches network attack in a like manner. Likewise,
DODD 0-8530.1, Computer Network Defense, dated January 8, 2001, is
classified.
The DOD's doctrinal view of cyberspace is found in Joint
Publication (JP) 6-0, Joint Communications System, dated March 20,
2006. It states:
The GIG [global information grid] operates as a
globally interconnected, end-to-end, interoperable
network-of-networks, which spans traditional
boundaries of authority. Given the inherent global
reach of the GIG, many NETOPS [network operations]
activities are not under the command authority of a
using CCDR [combatant commander]. Therefore, a
great deal of coordination and collaboration (unity of
effort) is essential to fully enable NETOPS
capabilities.29
JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, dated December 26, 2006,
notifies commanders of combatant commands and service commanders
to plan for asymmetrical threats. In terms of computer operations, the
doctrine states, "one example of a persistent, asymmetric threat that is
inherently global and poses risk cross-AOR [area of responsibility]
boundaries is adversary exploitation and attack of DOD computer
networks on the global information grid.",30 But in none of these rules is
there a consideration for policing cyber neutrality.
28 Siobahn Gorman, Gates to Nominate NSA Chief to Head New Cyber Command,
WALL STREET J., Apr. 24, 2009, http://online.wsj.com (last visited Sept. 11, 2009).
29 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 6-0, JOINT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM, at 71 (20
Mar. 2006), available at http://www.dtic.mil [hereinafter JP 6-0].
30 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 5-0, JOINT OPERATION PLANNING, at 1-22 (26 Dec.
2006), available at http://www.dtic.inl/doctrine/jel/newpubs/jp5_0.pdf [hereinafter JP
5-0].
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III. CYBER NEUTRALITY, A BASIC RUBRIc
Neutrality, in the United States, is primarily the executive
branch's province, as a matter of its constitutional authority over foreign
policy.31  In 1908, Woodrow Wilson, then president of Princeton
University, articulated, "One of the greatest of the President's powers I
have not yet spoken of at all: his control, which is very absolute, of the
foreign relations of the nation. The initiative in foreign affairs, which
the President possesses without any restriction whatever, is virtually the
power to control them absolutely., 32 Yet, at the beginning of World
War I, U.S. President Wilson declared the United States a neutral
nation, but American banks continued providing loans to Britain and
France, and American industry sold armaments almost exclusively to
Britain, France and their allies.33 The German government responded
by waging unrestricted submarine warfare, maritime commerce raiding,
and espionage activities within the continental United States.34
Wilson's neutrality stance was more emotional than actual, in
that he did not exercise executive authority to halt U.S. loans and arms
shipments to belligerents.35 Over a half century later, Supreme Court
Justice William 0. Douglas penned sentiments similar to Wilson's in
writing, "my view of foreign affairs is that Congress has the power to
declare war, and that all diplomacy short of that is under the guidance of
the President."36 Even as Douglas harshly criticized the Nixon
administration's policies in Vietnam and concluded the conflict was
"unlawful," Douglas held fast to the principle of executive authority in
foreign policy.37
It must be noted that although the executive branch is
preeminent in foreign policy, as a matter of checks and balances,
Congress does retain the authority to regulate foreign commerce and no
treaty can obligate the United States without the Senate's advice and
consent.38 In 1920, the Supreme Court determined that individual
states, of the United States, do not possess the authority to act contrary
31 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Koms & Kastenberg, supra note 1, at 61-62.
32 WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 77 (1908);
Koms & Kastenberg, supra note 1, at 61-62.
33 JENNIFER KEENE, WORLD WAR I: DAILY LIFE THROUGH HISTORY 5 (2006); RONALD
STEELE, WALTER LIPPMAN AND THE AMERICAN CENTURY 89 (1999).
34 WILLIAM MCNEILL, THE PURSUIT OF POWER 341-42 (1982); THEODORE Ropp, WAR IN
THE MODERN WORLD 257-58 (1959).
35 ANNE RICE PIERCE, WOODROW WILSON AND HARRY TRUMAN: MISSION AND POLICY IN
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 22 (2003).
36 WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS: 1939-1957, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 270
(1980).
37 id.
38 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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to a treaty.39 More importantly, this finding also extends to individual
corporations, which may not conduct trade with a foreign government
against the executive branch's prohibition of such trade. Indeed, where
a corporation violates this prohibition, it may be subject to criminal
sanctions. If the U.S. government establishes a strict position of
neutrality, corporations based in the United States may not provide
material support to a belligerent state, except where the government
permits. 40 Corporations may, however, engage in non-military trade or
provide humanitarian support.4'
For the purpose of this article, cyber neutrality does not depart
from the traditional international law of neutrality. This rubric of laws
requires combatant states to recognize the rights of neutrals. In
addition, neutral states must refrain from assisting either side in a
conflict, other than to effectuate peace.42 Neutrality laws as codified in
the 1907 Hague V Conventions give states certain legal rights when not
participating in a conflict, especially the right to remain neutral and
maintain relations with all belligerents.43 States that declare themselves
to be neutral, and act accordingly, are entitled to immunity from
attack.44 Neutrality does not require neutral states to shut off all
commerce with combatant states, although such commerce must not
expressly provide military aid to a combatant state during conflict.45
The Conventions also dictate that the territory of a neutral state is
inviolable; belligerents may not move troops, weapons, or other
materials of war across the territory of a neutral state.46 Belligerent
states may not conduct hostilities from the territory or waters of a
neutral state, and a belligerent's aircraft may not penetrate neutral
airspace.47 The Conventions require that neutral states prevent
belligerents from engaging in these violations.48 A neutral state that
39 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); U.S. v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
40 When the United States is in conflict with another nation, the President's power to
suppress trade with belligerent nations is almost absolute. See Trading with the Enemy
Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (2006).
41 Id. The U.S. State Department list of state sponsors of terrorism is at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c 1415 l.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2009).
42 Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case
of War on Land, arts. 1-3, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, 1 Bevans 654 (hereinafter
Hague Convention V]; see also Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of
Neutral Powers in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415, 1 Bevans 723 [hereinafter
Hague Convention XII]; STEPHEN C. NEFF, THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRALS 1
(2000).
43 Hague Convention XIII, supra note 42, art. 1.
44id.
45 Hague Convention V, supra note 42, art. 7.
461d. art. 5.
47 See Detlev Vagts, The Role of Switzerland: Neutrality Law in World War II, 20
CARDozo L. REV. 459, 465-67 (1998).
48 Hague Convention V, supra note 42, art. 9.
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takes no action jeopardizes its neutrality status. In 1917, the Supreme
Court cemented this framework into American jurisprudence.49
As an emerging form of warfare, cyber war is not explicitly
addressed under current international law, thus neither is cyber
neutrality. However, overarching principles apply to both.5 °  Cyber
warfare implicates the principle of neutrality because a belligerent may
launch attacks using the international structure of the Internet. The core
issue is the routing of these cyber attacks through neutral countries,
which is likely given the Internet's architecture. Cyber attacks routed
across the Internet nodes of neutral states would appear to violate
conventional neutrality law, despite the lack of physical intrusion.51 The
same would apply to cyber attacks launched from a neutral state, even if
the neutral state did not control the attack. International law would
appear to require a belligerent state (or third party neutral) to stop its
citizens from engaging in such acts.
International law is not definitive on whether cyber techniques
such as DDoS are legally considered "attacks" or "weapons, 52 and
whether cyber attacks can be considered legitimate acts of "armed
conflict., 53 Malicious software, or malware, is not an "arm" of war, yet
49 See The Steamship Appam, 243 U.S. 124 (1917). The Appam involved a British
vessel which had been seized on the high seas by the German Navy, but brought into an
American port for fuel. The Court found the seizure lawful under international law, but
once the German Navy brought the vessel into neutral American jurisdiction, the British
ship owners possessed standing to sue for recovery of the vessel because the Germans
had violated neutrality by bringing a war prize through neutral territory. Of importance,
the Court held: "The violation of American neutrality is the basis of jurisdiction, and
the admiralty courts may order restitution for a violation of such neutrality. In each case
the jurisdiction and order rests upon the authority of the courts of the United States to
make restitution to private owners for violations of neutrality where offending vessels
are within our jurisdiction, thus vindicating our rights and obligations as a neutral
people." Id. at 128.
50 Knut Drrmann, Computer Network Attack and International Humanitarian Law,
INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, May 19, 2001, available at http://www.icrc.org/web/
eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5p2alj; see also Robert G. Hanseman, The Realities and
Legalities of Information Warfare, 42 A.F. L. REv. 187 (1997); Bruce Smith, An Eye for
an Eye, a Byte for a Byte, FED. L., Oct. 1995, at 12; George K. Walker, Information
Warfare and Neutrality, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1079 (2000).
51 Lawrence T. Greenberg et al., Information Warfare and International Law 10 (1998),
available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lpsl804/iwilindex.htm.
52 Kelsey, supra note 3, at 1443; see also Steven M. Barney, Innocent Packets?
Applying Navigational Regimes from the Law of the Sea Convention by Analogy to the
Realm of Cyberspace, in THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF STRATEGY
ESSAY COMPETITION 1 (Nat'l Def. Univ. Press, 2001), available at http://www.ndu.edu/
inss/books/Books_2001/essays200l/Essays0l.pdf; Davis Brown, A Proposal for an
International Convention To Regulate the Use of Information Systems in Armed
Conflict, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 179 (2006); Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an
International Law for Information Operations, 11 LEwis & CLARK L. REv. 1023 (2007).
53 Kelsey, supra note 3, at 1443; see also Greenberg et al., supra note 51, at 30-33;
Hanseman, supra note 50, at 183; Gregory F. Intoccia & Joe W. Moore,
Neutrality in Cyberspace 53
the effects of cyber attacks can equal that of kinetic attacks. Arguably, a
cyber attack that causes physical destruction could constitute an "armed
attack" under the United Nations (UN) Charter. 54 The Charter appears
to define an "armed attack" as a crossing of geographic domains by the
use of armed force.55
Some advocates articulate that beyond transmitting a mere
communication signal, cyber attacks effectively move a weapon across
the Internet.56 For example, in issuing National Security Directive 16,
President George W. Bush ordered the development of guidelines to
regulate the use of "cyber weapons in war. 57 The Estonian Defense
Minister initially characterized the April 2007 Estonian cyber event as
an "extensive cyber attack., 58 He contemplated invoking NATO Article
V, which considers an "armed attack" against any NATO country to be
an attack against all. 59 A 2008 Defense Science Board report stated that
terrorists are using the Internet as an "asymmetric weapon.' ' 60 A past
assistant to the President for cyber security indicated that "[a]ttacks on
the Internet itself... could cause widespread problems.",61
On the other hand, some skeptics stress that no international
legal precedents clearly define cyber weapons, and point to the Law of
Armed Conflict (LOAC) as being unsettled with respect to cyber
attacks.6 a Admittedly, there is a rationale for this view. The Council of
Europe Convention on Cybercrime (COE Convention), to which the
Communications Technology, Warfare, and the Law: Is the Network A Weapon System?,
28 Hous. J. INT'L L. 469 (2006).54 U.N. Charter art. 51.55 id.
56 See Brown, supra note 52.
57 Bradley Graham, Bush Orders Guidelines for Cyber-Warfare: Rules for Attacking
Enemy Computers Prepared as US. Weighs Iraq Options, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2003, at
Al; Korns & Kastenberg, supra note 1, at 63.
58 Kevin Poulsen, Cyberwar and Estonia's Panic Attack, WIRED: THREAT LEVEL, Aug.
22, 2007, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/08/cyber-war-and-e.htm (last visited
Sept. 7, 2009); see also Jeremy Kirk, Estonia Recovers from Massive DDoS Attack,
COMPUTERWORLD.COM, May 17, 2007, http://www.computerworld.com (last visited
Sept. 7, 2009).
59 North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm ("The Parties agree that an armed attack
against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack
against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each
of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations... ").
60 DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD, FINAL REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK
FORCE ON STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 27 (2008).
61 John Schwartz, When Computers Attack, N.Y. TIMES.COM, June 24, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com (last visited Sept. 7, 2009) (quoting Paul Kurtz' statement that
"[a]ttacks on the Internet itself, say, through what are known as root-name servers,
which play a role in connecting Intemet users with Web sites, could cause widespread
l roblems").
Intoccia & Moore, supra note 44, at 484.
54 Air Force Law Review , Volume 64
United States is a party, does not contain any reference to cyber attacks,
and instead considers as criminal acts all offenses against "the
confidentiality, integrity or availability of computer systems. 63  The
Center for Strategic and International Studies points out that DDoS
attacks are more commonly used for illicit activities like fraud than for
cyber war.64 NATO defense ministers declined to define the Estonia
cyber event as an attack requiring military action.65 The Estonian
Justice Minister ultimately conceded that independent civilians, rather
than the Russian government, conducted cyber attacks against his
country. The Estonian government now classifies the incident as an act
of terrorism rather than cyber war.66
In 2005, the U.S. Air Force Operations and International Law
division published a memorandum stating "the network is not a weapon
system." , 7  An Internet security expert recently observed "there are
good reasons to reject the idea that timeout errors (DDoS) are an act of
war." 68  Until the obfuscation surrounding cyber attacks is better
clarified, many in the legal and technical communities will continue to
see DDoS events as acts for the criminal justice system--not the
national defense system-to resolve.
Although the debate over cyber conflict remains unsettled, the
international law community does appear to be coalescing around the
general principle that use of the Internet to conduct cross-border cyber
attacks violates the principle of neutrality. As one legal scholar has
noted, "[w]hen an information packet containing malicious code travels
63 United States Joins Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, DEP'T OF STATE,
Sept. 29, 2006, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2009);
see also Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, 2296 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter
COE Convention], available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/
Html/185.htm.
64 Schwartz, supra note 52 (quoting James Andrew Lewis' statement that "[t]hese 'bot-
nets' are more commonly used for illicit activities like committing online fraud and
sending spam").
65 Ian Traynor, Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia, GUARDIAN,
May 17, 2007, http://www.s.co.uk/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia (last visited
Sept. 7, 2009).66 EU Should Class Cyber Attacks as Terrorism: Estonia, BRISBANE TIMES.COM, June 8,
2007, http ://news.brisbanetimes.com.au/technology/eu-should-class-cyber-attacks-as-
terrorism-estonia-20070608-h9r.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2009); see also Joel Hruska,
Student Behind DoS Attack that Rekindled Bad Soviet Memories, ARS TECHNICA, Jan.
24, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080124-student-behind-dos-attack-
that-rekindled-bad-soviet-memories.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2009); Jeremy Kirk,
Student Fined for Attack Against Estonian Web Site, INFOWORLD (Internet edition), Jan.
24, 2008, http://www.infoworld.com/article/08/01/24/Student-fined-for-attack-against-
Estonian-Web-sitel .html (last visited Sept. 7, 2009).
67 Memorandum from U.S. Air Force Operations and Int'l L. Div., to Staff Judge
Advocate, U.S. Air Force Comm. Agency, subject: Legal Issues Related to "Network as
a Weapon System" (13 May 2005) (on file with author).
68 Poulsen, supra note 58.
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through computer systems under the jurisdiction of a neutral state, a
strict construction of the law of neutrality would result in that state's
neutrality being violated., 69 This evolution in thought should concern
the United States, because as cyber conflict increases it is likely that the
United States will see increased incursions on or across its Internet
assets.
A surrender of neutrality or acquiescence to belligerent activity
may draw a neutral state into the conflict. 70 Under this rule, if a neutral
state cannot or does not take action to halt a cyber attack, a belligerent
may choose to counter by physically attacking the neutral state's
communications infrastructure. Thus, even without the physical
violation of a neutral state's territory, a cyber attack may force a neutral
state to become unwillingly involved. This loss of non-belligerent
status is precisely what the Hague laws of neutrality seek to avoid. In
short, although there is a growing body of legal thought, the concept of
cyber neutrality remains ill-defined under current U.S. and international
law. U.S. planners will likely see an increase in the number of
situations where U.S. cyber neutrality is brought into question. The
challenge for U.S. strategists is how to plan for cyber neutrality with
little precedence.
Neutrality law also defines a limited telecommunications
exception. Under Article VIII of the 1907 Hague Convention V, "[a]
neutral Power is not called upon to forbid or restrict the use on behalf of
the belligerents of telegraph or telephone cables or of wireless
telegraphy apparatus," so long as the neutral state impartially permits
the use of those structures by all belligerents. 7' The United States
interprets this article as applying to modern communications.72 Article
VII implies that as long as a neutral party allows all belligerents equal
passage on its communications infrastructure, neutrality is not violated.
However, legal experts question whether the Article VIII exception
applies to modern IT systems which can generate and transmit malicious
data packets from, or across, a neutral party's Internet infrastructure to
attack another belligerent's computer systems.73
Cyber neutrality may be defined as the right of any state to
maintain relations with all parties in a cyber conflict, and the right not to
69 William J. Bayles, The Ethics of Computer Network Attack, PARAMETERS, Spring
2001, at 44, 44-45, available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/
01 spring/bayles.htm.70 Hague Convention V, supra note 33, art. 8.
71 id.
72 DEP'T OF DEF. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ISSUES IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS (1999), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/
awcgate/dod-io-legal/dod-io-legal.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2009); see also Roger D.
Scott, Legal Aspects of Information Warfare: Military Disruption of
Telecommunications, 45 NAVAL L. REV. 57, 62 (1998).
73 Kelsey, supra note 3, at 1442.
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support or take sides with any cyber belligerent. Under a traditional
international law rubric, to remain neutral in a cyber conflict, a cyber
neutral state must not originate a cyber attack, and it must also, within
its capabilities, take action to prevent a cyber attack from transiting its
Internet nodes.74 A neutral state also has the obligation to police its
peoples from independently taking action. Admittedly, this may be
difficult in states which emphasize the almost unlimited right of free
speech, but, if a neutral state takes no action, it risks losing its cyber
neutral status. The U.S. Constitutional framework is more than
adequate to allow for appropriate action.
IV. CASE STUDY: THE CYBER ATTACK ON GEORGIA
CONSEQUENCES FOR U.S. CYBER NEUTRALITY
On July 19, 2008, unknown persons used a computer located at
a U.S. ".com" Internet protocol address 75 to command and control (C2)
a DDoS attack against the website of Georgia's president, Mikheil
Saakashvili.76  The DDoS attack rendered the Georgian website
inoperable for over 24 hours. Some security analysts speculate that this
DDoS attack may have been a dress rehearsal for larger cyber operations
against Georgia that ensued later in August 2008. 7  Analysts were
unable to pinpoint the party who controlled the U.S. computer.
However, cyber security experts identified the C2 server as a MachBot
DDoS controller written in Russian and frequently used by Russian
hackers. Therefore, analysts speculated on ties to Russia. 8
74 Id. at 1443.
75 A computer with a ".com" Internet address implies a commercial entity; a ".gov"
Internet address is reserved for U.S. Government use. Use of a ".com" computer in this
specific DDoS attack implies the computer was not under direct U.S. government control.
7 Adair, supra note 7; see also Dancho Danchev, Georgia President's Web Site Under
DDoS Attack From Russian Hackers, ZDNET, July 22, 2008, http://blogs.zdnet.com/
security/?p=1533 (last visited Sept. 7, 2009); John Markoff, Before the Gunfire,
Cberattacks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com.
Markoff, supra note 13.
78 Adair, supra note 8. Adair writes,
[Although] DDoS attacks against various other neighbors of Russia
to include Estonia have been quite popular in the last few years...
we do not have any solid proof that the people behind this C&C
[C2] server are Russian. However, the HTTP-based botnet C2
server is a MachBot controller, which is a tool that is frequently
used by Russian bot-herders. On top of that, the domain involved
with this C2 server . . . does tie back to Russia .... This server
recently came online in the past few weeks and has not issued any
other attacks ... all attacks we have observed have been directed
right at www.president.gov.ge.
Id.
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The COE Convention characterizes the July 2008 DDoS attack
against Georgia as cyber crime, not cyber war.7 9 Within the COE
Convention construct, the United States should have taken action under
Article II (illegal access) and Article IV (system interference) to prevent
the DDoS attack, a crime against Georgia.80 Apparently, the attack
stopped only after a private company took action on its own and blocked
access to the U.S computer that controlled that DDoS attack.8 1 The
implication is that the international community prefers viewing DDoS
attacks as criminal in nature. The result has been a growing body of
cybercrime law, yielding additional clarity and cooperation. In fact, the
U.S. Department of Justice successfully prosecuted several cases over
the past two years involving DDoS attacks. 2  From the COE
Convention's perspective, Interpol, rather than NATO, would have been
the proper response to the Estonian (April 2007) and Georgian (July
2008) DDoS attacks. This same level of clarity is lacking when the
nature of a cyber event changes from criminal to war between nation
states.
On August 8, 2008, cyber security experts observed a second
wave of DDoS attacks against Georgian websites.83 This time, analysts
speculate that the attacks coincided with Russia's movement of military
forces into South Ossetia. Some have even characterized this incident
as the first time a known cyber attack coincided with a "ground war."
84
The DDoS attack spread to computers throughout the Georgian
government.8 5  The Georgian Foreign Ministry blamed Russia for the
79 United States Joins Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 63; see also COE
Convention, supra note 63.
80 Koms & Kastenberg, supra note 1, at 63.
81 Adair, supra note 8.
82 See, e.g., Botherder Dealt Record Prison Sentence for Selling and Spreading
Malicious Computer Code, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, May 8, 2006,
http://www.cybercrime.gov/anchetaSent.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2009) ("Concluding
the first prosecution of its kind in the United States, [U.S. v. Ancheta], a well known
member of the 'botmaster underground' was sentenced this afternoon to nearly five
years in prison for profiting from his use of botnets--armies of compromised computers-
-that he used to launch destructive attacks . . . [the defendant] was sentenced to 57
months in federal prison ... the longest known sentence for a defendant who spread
computer viruses.); see also Operator of a 'Bot-net' Network of Thousands of Virus-
Infected Computers Sentenced to 12 Months in Federal Prison, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, Oct. 23, 2007, http://www.cybercrime.gov/downeySent.pdf (last visited Sept.
7, 2009); Indictment andArrest for Computer Hacking, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Oct.
1, 2007, http://www.cybercrime.govikinglndict.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2009).
83 Koms & Kastenberg, supra note 1, at 65.
84 Markoff, supra note 13; see also Brandon Griggs, U.S. at Risk of Cyberattacks,
Experts Say, CNN.COM, Aug. 18, 2008, http://www.cnn.com (last visited Sept. 7, 2009).
85 Adair, supra note 8; see also Russian Business Network (RBN) Now Nationalized,
Invades Georgia Cyber Space, RUSSIAN Bus. NETwORK, Aug. 9, 2008,
http://rbnexploit.blogspot.com/2008/08/rbn-georgia-cyberwarfare.html (last visited Sept.
7, 2009); Waterman, supra note 10.
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attacks. 86 Others pointed to the Russian Business Network (RBN), a
criminal syndicate suspected of being under Russian government
influence.87 Conversely, an Internet journalist visited a website where
he downloaded pre-packaged software that enabled him within
minutes-had he chosen to do so-to join in the DDoS attacks against
Georgia. His assessment:
In less than an hour, I had become an Internet soldier. I
didn't receive any calls from Kremlin operatives; nor
did I have to buy a Web server or modify my computer
in any significant way ... [m]y experiment also might
shed some light on why the recent cyberwar has been so
hard to pin down .... Paranoid that the Kremlin's hand
is everywhere, we risk underestimating the great
patriotic rage of many ordinary Russians, who ... are
convinced they need to crash Georgian Web sites.
Many Russians undoubtedly went online to learn how
to make mischief, as I did. Within an hour, they, too,
could become cyber-warriors.88
Some cyber security analysts have concluded that the August
2008 DDoS attack against Georgia was a mix of government
incentivized, organized cyber crime syndicates such as RBN, as well as
ordinary cyber-citizen protestors. 89 Gadi Evron, former head of cyber
security for the Israeli government, stated "this is not warfare, but just
some unaffiliated attacks by Russian hackers." 90 Arbor Networks, a
security firm, "found no evidence... of state-sponsored cyber-warfare"
86 Cyber Attacks Disable Georgian Websites, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF GEORGIA,
Aug. 11, 2008, http://georgiamfa.blogspot.com/2008 08_01_archive.html (last visited
Sept. 7, 2009).
87 RBN Now Nationalized, RuSSIAN Bus. NETWORK, Aug. 9, 2008,
http://rbnexploit.blogspot.com/2008/08/rbn-georgia-cyberwarfare.html (last visited Sept.
7, 2009).
88 Evgeny Morozov, An Army of Ones and Zeroes - How I Became a Soldier in the
Georgia-Russia Cyberwar, SLATE, Aug. 14, 2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2197514
(last visited Sept. 7, 2009); see also Evgeny Morozov,
http://evgenymorozov.com/blog/?p=416 (last visited Sept. 7, 2009).
89 Waterman, supra note 10; see also Dancho Danchev, Coordinated Russia vs Georgia
Cyber Attack In Progress, ZDNET, Aug. 11, 2008, http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/
?p=1670 (last visited Sept. 7, 2009); Joel Hruska, Russians May Not be Responsible for
Cyberattacks on Georgia, ARS TECHNICA, Aug. 13, 2008, http://arstechnica.com (last
visited Sept. 7, 2009).
90 Gadi Evron, Internet Attacks Against Georgian Websites, CIRCLEID, Aug. 11, 2008,
http://www.circleid.com/posts/88116_Internetattacksgeorgia (last visited Sept. 7,
2009).
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and characterized the attackers as most likely "non-state actors. ' '9'
Experts at cyber security firm Shadowserver indicated "it would appear
that these cyber attacks have certainly moved into the hands of the
average computer using citizen.
' 92
While receiving less attention than analysis of the DDoS attacks
against Georgia, perhaps of greater importance to U.S. policy makers is
the Georgian government's novel reaction. If the responsibilities of
states during cyber conflict are somewhat unclear, they are even more
ambiguous when a belligerent seeks cyber refuge in a neutral state's
territory.
Tulip Systems (TSHost) is a private web hosting company in
Atlanta, Georgia. On August 8, while in the country of Georgia, the
owner of TSHost apparently contacted Georgian government officials
directly and offered assistance.93 That the owner of TSHost is a U.S.
resident of Georgian birth cannot be overlooked. 94 On August 9, the
Georgian government transferred critical governmental Internet services
to TSHost servers in the United States, including the Georgian
President's website. In an admission, the TSHost Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) stated that the company had volunteered its servers to
"protect" the nation of Georgia's Internet sites from malicious traffic. 95
TSHost further revealed that after it relocated Georgian websites to the
United States, DDoS attacks, traced to Moscow and St. Petersburg,
ensued against TSHost's servers. 96  The TSHost CEO confirmed the
company reported the attacks to the FBI, but he did not claim to obtain
government sanction for his activities.
This important fact is not widely publicized: a U.S. company
with no clear authority and no apparent U.S. government approval
91 Kelly Jackson Higgins, Botnets Behind Georgian Attacks Offer Clues, DARK
READING, Sept. 9, 2008, http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc-id=163342
(last visited Sept. 7, 2009).
92Adair, supra note 8 ("Since August 8, 2008, a large number of Georgian websites,
both government and non-government alike, have come under attack.. .one of the
Georgian government websites was being attacked by dozens of Russian computers
from several different ISPs throughout the country... lots of ICMP traffic and Russian
hosts sounds a lot more like users firing off the 'ping' command... much like in the
attacks against Estonia, several Russian blogs, forums, and websites are spreading a
Microsoft Windows batch script that is designed to attack Georgian websites... it would
appear that these cyber attacks have certainly moved into the hands of the average
computer using citizen."); Koms & Kastenberg, supra note 1, at 66. A redacted version
of the actual software script used in the DDoS attacks is also available at the site hosting
Adair's article.
93 Peter Svensson, Russian Hackers Continue Attacks on Georgian Sites, AP NEWS,
Aug. 12, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/techlproducts/2008-08-12-2416394828_x.htm
(last visited Sept. 7, 2009); see also Griggs, supra note 84; Koms & Kastenberg, supra
note 1, at 63; Svensson, supra note 13.
94 Koms & Kastenberg, supra note 1, at 63.
95 Griggs, supra note 84.
96 Svensson, supra note 13.
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directly contacted the Georgian government and arranged to protect its
Internet assets by moving them to U.S. territory. 97 Undeterred, cyber
attackers followed and turned their DDoS attacks against the U.S. site.
As a result of TSHost actions, the U.S. effectively experienced cyber
collateral damage.
98
On August 8, the Georgian government sought additional
protection within the United States by transferring its official MFA and
government news sites to Google's Blogspot. 99  While Georgia's
combat troops were retreating to Tbilisi to defend the capital, Georgia's
cyber forces were turning to the United States to defend the country's
Internet capabilities. Google effectively became the cyber refugee camp
for Georgia's cyber property. 100  The Georgian government used
equipment located in U.S. territory-specifically Google's Internet
servers in California-to protect its Internet capabilities and ensure
continued war-time communications with its citizens and forces.
Georgia's creative cyber strategy relied on relocation to the United
States because the Georgian government did not believe DDoS attackers
could take down Google's servers, given the company's vast
infrastructure and ability to defend it. l0 1 It does not appear that the
Georgian government coordinated this strategy with the U.S. prior to
execution. There were also accusations, later refuted, that Google
removed details of Georgian maps from its on-line mapping service. 1
02
In the Georgian-Russian cyber conflict, the actions of the
Georgian government and a well-intentioned, patriotic CEO could have
imperiled U.S. cyber neutrality. Apparently, neither Google's nor
TSHost's actions had U.S. government involvement or approval. 1
03
As noted above, Article II of Hague Convention V forbids
belligerents from erecting on the territory of a neutral Power a wireless
97 Korns & Kastenberg, supra note 1, at 67.
98 id.
99 Jon Swaine, Georgia: Russia Conducting Cyber War, TELEGRAPH, Aug. 11, 2008,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/2539 157/-Georgia-Russia-
conducting-cyber-war.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2008); see also Larry Dignan, Georgia
Turns to Google's Blogger to Counter Alleged Cyber Attack, SEEKING ALPHA, Aug. 11,
2008, http://seekingalpha.com (last visited Sept. 7, 2009); Pete Swabey, Google
Embroiled in Georgian Conflict, INFO. AGE, Aug. 12, 2008, http://www.information-
age.com (last visited Sept. 7, 2009).
10 Korns & Kastenberg, supra note 1, at 67.
101 Id.
102 Id.; see also Dave Barth, Where is Georgia on Google Maps?, GOOGLE LAT LONG
BLOG, Aug. 12, 2008, http://google-latlong.blogspot.com/2008/08/where-is-georgia-on-
google-maps.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2009); see also Miguel Helft, Google: We Did
Not Erase Maps of Georgia, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG, Aug. 12, 2008, http://bits.blogs.
nytimes.com/2008/08/12/google-we-did-not-erase-maps-of-georgia (last visited Sept. 7,
2009); Katie Hunter, Tuesday Map: Georgia's Google Vanishing Act, FOREIGN POL'Y:
PASSPORT, Aug. 12, 2008, http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/node/9515 (last visited Sept. 7,
2009).
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telegraphy station or other apparatus for the purpose of communicating
with belligerent forces on land or sea. °4 One could argue that the
Georgian government, as a cyber belligerent, violated this law when it
established websites on U.S. cyber neutral territory, and then used the
websites as "other apparatus" to communicate with its forces back in the
territory of Georgia. The United States took no action to halt these
operations. Further, it did not direct TSHost or Google to terminate
support for Georgia. By allowing U.S. private companies to protect the
Georgian government's Internet assets, one could make the case that the
U.S. government jeopardized, or even relinquished, its cyber neutrality,
and subjected the U.S. cyber infrastructure to potential attack.
Added to this issue, cyber corps or cyber warriors are terms
often used in reference to U.S. government civilian and military
personnel who conduct cyber operations. 105 This military nomenclature
may be problematic. Given that the U.S. private industry operates the
majority of the Internet, there is concern as to whether the category of
cyber combatant could be extended to include private civilians operating
the Internet. 10 6 When speaking about the success of her company in
blocking DDoS attacks against Georgia's website, the TSHost CEO
stated, "our people aren't getting any sleep."' 1 7 Article IV of Hague V
prohibits neutrals from forming "corps of combatants" to assist
belligerents. Although unlikely, TSHost and Google actions could be
interpreted as a violation of Hague V in that they formed a quasi-corps
of cyber combatants on behalf of the U.S. government to protect
Georgia's Internet assets.
Hague V Articles VIII and IX provide that a neutral state is not
required to restrict a belligerent's use of the neutral's
telecommunications systems, as long as these services are provided
impartially to all belligerents. 0 8  The U.S. government could have
required TSHost and Google to terminate Internet services for the
Georgian government. By its silence, the U.S. government may have
unknowingly established an unwanted precedence. Conceivably, future
cyber belligerents, taking note of U.S. inaction in the Georgian case,
could under the Hague V impartiality clause (Article IX) demand
similar cyber refuge, or use of U.S. Internet infrastructure. The
potential implications are disturbing.
104 Hague Convention V, supra note 42, art. 3.
105 Fact Sheet: Protecting America's Critical Infrastructure - Cyber Security, DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SEC., Feb. 15, 2005, http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/ (last visited Sept.
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Clearly, the Georgian and Russian governments were
conventional belligerents in the Ossetian theater of conflict. It is
unclear, however, if they were cyber belligerents. When bombs and
bullets fly, identification is relatively easy; not so for cyber weapons.
Both governments claim they did not participate in the DDoS attacks.' 09
Expert analysis appears to substantiate, to a degree, that technically the
governments themselves did not directly participate in cyber conflict. "0
The July and August DDoS attacks could be characterized as cyber
conflict by proxy. Instead of states, it appears that cyber criminals as
well as hundreds of loosely self-organized, non-combatant citizens and
self-styled cyber-militias inflicted the attacks. This leads to uncertainty
as to which attackers were officially cyber belligerents, and which ones
were cyber neutrals.
Existing international laws of war focus primarily on conflicts
between nation states, and are fundamentally weak in addressing non-
state actor participation in cyber conflict. The 2007 Estonian cyber
event serves as a superb case study. Although it was originally called
cyber war, this changed in the post conflict retrospective analysis.
Governments and experts concluded that unknown, non-state actors
conducting DDoS attacks against a Baltic nation-state is not cyber war;
at best, according to Estonian officials, it is terrorism. " The DDoS
attacks against Georgia were strikingly similar to the Estonian case, and
therefore place in doubt whether an actual state of cyber conflict existed
between the governments of Georgia and Russia. This interpretation
certainly raises questions regarding the legal status of U.S. cyber
neutrality. The Georgian case stands as the latest example of the untidy
nature of cyber conflict. Clearly, the Estonian and Georgian cyber
events have established new precedents and subtexts for cyber war and
neutrality.
The terms "cyberspace" and "global electronic village" imply
that the Internet is a stateless and borderless entity used by all and
owned by none. 112  Some in the legal community have used these
notions to define cyberspace as a "separate place," governed by its own
legal framework, where international treaties don't apply and
governments have yielded sovereignty to "netizens" and self-regulatory
initiatives." 3 These symbolic notions do not stand up to reality. The
109 Korns & Kastenberg, supra note 1, at 70.
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L.J. 39, 41-44 (2001).
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ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FouND., Feb. 8, 1996, http://www.eff.org/-barlow/Declaration-
Final.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2009); Michael Geist, Cyberlaw 2.0, 44 BOSTON
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Internet in fact does have borders. Internet equipment is government or
corporate owned. Internet assets are located in facilities within the
territories of recognized nation states. Internet equipment is connected
to national electric grids. 1
4
When the government of Georgia relocated its Internet
capabilities to TSHost and Google servers, it did not move its cyber
assets to "space"; rather, it moved actual government data and
information capabilities to equipment located in the states of Georgia
and California, within U.S. territory. Under traditional Hague V
Conventions, this act could be interpreted as a violation of U.S.
neutrality. Nonetheless, there remains a lack of international agreement
on how "border-centric" laws relate to the notion of a "borderless"
Internet. This impinges on the cyber neutrality concept, which is built
upon the traditional notion of absolute, recognizable borders.
V. CONCLUSION
As noted in the introduction, this article does not advocate that
the United States must enforce neutrality in cyberspace in conflicts to
which it is not a party. It does argue, however, that based on the current
and future nature of interstate conflict, the executive branch should
consider whether it is in the national interest to assert its authority to
enforce neutrality in cyberspace. This is important because belligerent
governments may consider U.S. corporations assisting their opponent
states as a legitimate target for a cyber counter-strike (or perhaps a
kinetic strike). Whether the executive branch determines that cyber
neutrality is important to advocate for as an international law principle
is outside the scope of this article as well. However, it is clear that the
executive branch should be prepared to assert its Constitutional
authority to enforce cyber neutrality before two belligerent states enter
into conflict. And, commensurate with this authority, the federal
government can organize and train to preserve this neutrality should the
need arise.
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